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I. INTRODUCTION
No longer are capital markets circumscribed by national borders.
Recently, the movement towards the harmonization of secondary trad-
ing markets has quickened.' For example, linkages now exist between
the American and Toronto Stock Exchanges2 and the Toronto and
Midwest Stock Exchanges.3 Future linkages among the three seasoned
exchanges (New York, London and Tokyo) lie just beyond the hori-
zon." However, another vehicle for the internationalization of capital
markets, simultaneous multinational stock offerings, has not developed
as quickly.
In February, 1985, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) took a step to expedite the development of multinational offer-
ings, issuing a release to encourage the exploration of possible methods
to harmonize disclosure and distribution practices by multinational is-
suers.5 In the release, two conceptual approaches were proposed: the
common prospectus approach and the reciprocal approach.' The SEC
1. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has given the following rea-
sons for this trend: abandonment of U.S. investment controls, floating exchange rates,
and new technology in the areas of communication and transportation. For a more
complete list, see Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 6568, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,743 (Feb.
28, 1985), also found at 32 SEC DOCKET 914 [hereinafter the Release](page refer-
ences are to the SEC DOCKET).
2. Amex, Toronto Exchanges Begin Trading Via Link, Wall St. J., Sept. 25,
1985, at 56, col. 6.
3. Exchanges in the Midwest, Toronto Start Trade Links, Wall St. J., June 17,
1986, at 45, col. 1.
4. See SEC Begins Securities Industry Talks On Global Trading Within 2 Years,
Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1985, at 4, col. 2; Big Board, London Stock Exchange Discuss
Trading, Data-Reporting Joint Ventures, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1985, at 3, col. 2; Tokyo
Stock Exchange Mulls Office in New York, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1985, at 34, col. 1.
5. The Release, supra note 1.
6. Id. at 916; A discussion of the two approaches is provided infra notes 83-91 and
accompanying text.
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requested comments on these approaches or alternative approaches that
were "feasible, practical and consistent with investor protection." 7
This paper will discuss the advantages of internationalizing capital
markets and will analyze the SEC's release and the responses which it
elicited. An ,alternative approach, "a two-tiered reciprocal" approach,
will then be discussed. Finally, the paper will examine potential trouble
spots in the existing U.S. regulatory system that would have to be ad-
dressed under any approach.
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INCREASED
MULTINATIONAL SECURITIES OFFERINGS
A. Advantages to U.S. Investors8
An increase in the number of multinational offerings would in-
crease the investment opportunities available to individual U.S. inves-
tors.9 Typically, under the existing regulatory system, individual U.S.
investors purchase foreign securities in the form of American Deposi-
tory Receipts (ADRs).10 A major shortcoming of this system is that
U.S. investors are unable to participate in rights offerings of foreign
issuers. This would not be the case, however, if the foreign issuers were
listed on an American exchange." U.S. institutional investors, on the
other hand, because of their ability to establish relationships with mem-
bers of foreign exchanges and more advanced communication systems,
have been able to trade directly in foreign securities markets.' 2 Thus,
an increase in investment opportunities would have a greater impact on
individual investors.
7. Id. at 914.
8. For purposes of this discussion, I am assuming that a foreign issuer who makes
a multinational offering will also be listed on a U.S. exchange. This assumption is made
because some of the benefits discussed are premised on the existence of active second-
ary trading in the foreign security.
9. Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 169-73 (1982).
10. ADRs are typically created and sold by U.S. banks that establish a foreign
depository for a particular foreign security. The banks then sell beneficial interests in
the foreign securities deposited abroad, ADRs. For a more thorough discussion of
ADRs, see id. at 169 n.53.
11. Id. at 170 n.53. Although rights offerings are not available to U.S. investors
holding ADRs, the investors do receive cash, since the banks will sell these rights in the
foreign market. Letter from the law firm of Davis, Polk, & Wardwell to John Wheeler,
Secretary of the SEC, at 5 (July 15, 1985) [hereinafter Davis Letter]. The Davis Let-
ter and all other letters cited in this paper are found in File S7-9-85 in the SEC's
Public Reference Room.
12. Thomas, supra note 9, at 167.
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Following are benefits that may accrue to individual and institu-
tional investors alike. First, the returns from foreign stocks have histor-
ically been higher than returns on American stocks. s The average an-
nual yield of American stocks between 1970 and 1980 was 5.8%,
whereas, for example, Japanese, Canadian and Swiss stocks had yields
of 16.7%, 11.6%, and 11.7%, respectively.1" Assuming this trend will
continue, American investors should receive a higher rate of return by
purchasing foreign stocks.
Second, American investors would decrease their investment risks
through portfolio diversification.1" Economists have found that changes
in the stock index of a country explain between 20% and 50% of the
change in the rate of return for a specific stock.16 In addition, econo-
mists have found insignificant correlations between stock indices of the
United States and stock indices of foreign countries.17 Thus, investors
can reduce portfolio risks by purchasing stocks from a variety of coun-
tries. The gains from securities purchased in one country would offset
the losses from another.
Third, foreign issuers' compliance with U.S. securities laws, as op-
posed to those of foreign countries, would result in increased disclosure
to U.S. investors. 18 This conclusion is based on the belief that "SEC
disclosure requirements. . .[are] significantly more rigorous than those
of other countries."' 9 As will be discussed later, there may not be a
13. Analysts have developed the concept of a "holding period yield" to compare
the rate of return of stocks from different countries. Basically, the computation involves
measuring the gains or losses in the stock price, adding dividends, and subtracting
taxes due on resale of the security. The analysis also takes changes in exchange rates
into account. For a more complete analysis, see Abrams & Kimball, U.S. Investment in
Foreign Equity Markets, ECON. REV., Apr. 1981, at 24; see also, Foreign Stocks Out-
pace U.S. Blue Chips by Big Margin, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 15, col. I.
14. Abrams & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25.
15. See Solnik, Why Not Diversify Internationally Rather than Domestically? 33
FIN. ANALYST J., July-Aug. 1977, at 48; Agimon & Lessard, Investor Recognition of
Corporate International Diversification, 32 J. FIN. 1049 (1977); Lessard, World, Coun-
try, and Industry Relationships in Equity Returns, FIN. ANALYST J., Jan.-Feb. 1976,
at 33.
16. Lessard, supra note 15, at 32-38.
17. Bergstrom, A New Route to Higher Return and Lower Risk, I 1 J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT., Fall 1975, at 31.
18. As discussed infra at notes 120-21 and accompanying text, foreign issuers of-
fering securities in the U.S. become subject to SEC periodic reporting requirements,
absent an exemption. If issuers list on a U.S. exchange, they must also comply with the
exchange's reporting requirements.
19. Thomas, Internationalization of the World's Capital Markets: Can the SEC
Help Shape the Future? 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 55, 58 (1982).
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dramatic increase in disclosure by foreign issuers if the reciprocal ap-
proach is adopted."
Fourth, transaction costs associated with purchasing a foreign se-
curity would be reduced.2' While this benefit may be more significant
in relation to the globalization of secondary trading, savings would still
be realized by U.S. investors participating in offerings (cable costs, cur-
rency conversion, commission fees).
Fifth, investors will do more research on foreign issuers.2 2 Cur-
rently, there is little such American-based research. As a foreign issuer
increases its visibility in the United States through an offering and a
subsequent listing on a U.S. exchange, the securities industry will fol-
low it more closely. American-based research, as opposed to foreign-
based research, would inform U.S. investors of the risks associated with
purchasing foreign securities, modify the foreign issuer's financial in-
formation so that comparisons could be made with comparable U.S.
corporations, address the differences between U.S. accounting princi-
ples and standards and those of foreign countries, and provide informa-
tion gleaned from the management of foreign issuers."
Sixth, additional risks associated with owning foreign securities
would be reduced. 4 For example, the effect of changes in the exchange
rates between the dollar and foreign currencies on the rate of return of
foreign securities, in dollars, may decrease. As one commentator has
noted, "if. . .a foreign stock develops a larger market in the United
States than in its home country, there may be some reduction in ex-
change risk to the extent that the price is no longer purely a derivative
of the price denominated in a foreign currency."' ' Another risk that
would be reduced is the risk that the value of a foreign stock may de-
crease due to the imposition of capital controls by a foreign government
(prohibition on remittance of proceeds from sales or confiscation of the
securities). It is postulated that, if a foreign issuer lists on a U.S. ex-
change, a foreign government will find it more difficult to impose such
20. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the idea that
increased disclosure may not result under either the reciprocal approach or the com-
mon prospectus approach.
21. Thomas, supra note 9, at 170-73.
22. U.S. financial analysts, unlike European and British analysts, are known for
their complete scrutiny of issuers. See The Perils of Multimarket Offerings, INST. IN-
VESTOR, Oct. 1974, at 73.
23. See generally Thomas, supra note 9, at 173-74.
24. Id. at 174.
25. Id.
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controls.2 6 Finally, the risk of an illiquid market upon resale of the se-
curity will be reduced.
B. Advantages to Other Groups
The emergence of multinational offerings and more widespread
secondary trading will also have positive externalities for the following
groups. First, there would be more work for the securities industry and
its complementary industries. Second, American citizens would benefit
from the increase in tax revenues. Presumably, multinational offerings
would create more income for those employed in the securities industry
and other related fields, and thus, more income taxes would be paid.
Also, sales tax revenue from securities transactions would increase as
the number of transactions increased. It has been estimated that the
tax revenue from a public offering by a foreign issuer could range be-
tween $300,000 and $600,000. Third, the SEC would have broader
regulatory jurisdiction. 8 Finally, foreign investors and corporations
would have increased access to U.S. capital markets.
C. Overall Advantages vs. Potential Disadvantages to U.S.
Corporations and Investors
The globalization concept has not met with unanimous support.
Taking a protectionist position, some argue that U.S. issuers will be
harmed by opening the doors of U.S. capital markets to foreign issuers
because much-needed capital will be diverted away from U.S. issuers:
the "crowding-out" effect.2 9 Some U.S. issuers also fear that they will
be placed at an unfair disadvantage if foreign issuers are subject to less
rigorous disclosure requirements than the ones with which they must
comply.30 Others have asserted that U.S. investors will also be harmed
if foreign issuers are not subject to the same disclosure requirements. 1
These concerns, however, appear to be unfounded, and in fact,
U.S. corporations may even benefit from eliminating the roadblocks to
26. Id.
27. Id. at 177 n.86 (citing memorandum from Joel A. Ornstein and F. Scott Red-
ing, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., to Commissioner Barbara S. Thomas (Dec. 11,
1981)).
28. Letter from Merrill Lynch Capital Markets to John Wheeler, Secretary of the
SEC, at 2 (July 15, 1985) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch Letter]. See also Thomas, supra
note 9, at 177.
29. Thomas, supra note 19, at 60.
30. Letter from CPC International, Inc., to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC,
at 1 (Apr. 23, 1985).
31. Id.
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multinational offerings. U.S. corporations, over the past few years, have
been well received by foreign investors. In fact, between 1971 and
1980, there was a net inflow of $23, 250 million of capital into the
United States.32 Given the proclivity of foreign investors to invest in
U.S. securities, it is very likely that U.S. issuers' opportunities to raise
capital will be broadened more than foreign issuers' if multinational
offerings are encouraged. It should be pointed out, however, that if for-
eign issuers are permitted to conduct U.S. offerings requiring less dis-
closure than is called for in a domestic U.S. offering, U.S. capital mar-
kets will be more appealing to foreign issuers than heretofore. One
commentator has argued that adopting a protectionist position may
even harm U.S. issuers, under the theory that they will be met with
regulatory opposition when they seek to raise capital abroad.33
The proposition that foreign issuers will "crowd-out" capital that
would have been raised by U.S. issuers is also subject to dispute. This
conclusion is based on two observations. First, the percentage of the
total capital raised in the United States by foreign issuers is minimal.
From 1976 to 1980 this percentage ranged from .7% to 3.4%.4 Even if
the percentage of foreign involvement were to double, the impact on
U.S. issuers would not be dramatic.3 5 Second, "foreign investors
purchase a significant proportion of foreign securities offered in the
United States .... 30
In the end, the decision to pursue the facilitation of multinational
offerings should be based on a cost-benefit analysis. If the benefits to
U.S. investors and issuers are greater than the costs, or the harm, the
SEC should accommodate them through its regulatory powers. Based
on the foregoing analysis, it appears that the benefits outweigh the
costs.
III. THE MULTINATIONAL EXPERIENCE: PROBLEMS AND PROMISES
To date, there have been few simultaneous multinational offerings.
The offerings receiving the most attention have been by British Petro-
32. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, TREAS. BULL. 103 (July 1981). Net capital inflow
means that purchases of U.S. securities by foreigners were greater than the purchases
of foreign securities by U.S. investors. This figure, $23,250 million, includes both secur-
ities offerings and secondary trading; however, given the magnitude of inflow, it is
likely that the same result would be reached if only securities offerings were included.
33. Thomas, supra note 19, at 61.
34. Thomas, supra note 9, at 181.
35. In addition, the increased availability of U.S. issuers to foreign capital mar-
kets would lessen further the impact of any crowding-out effect.
36. Thomas, supra note 9, at 179.
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leum, PLC (1977), s7 Reuters Holdings, PLC (1984), 3' and British
Telecommunications, PLC (1984).- 9 Other issuers have engaged in
multinational offerings, but they were neither of the same magnitude in
volume nor as broad in terms of the number of countries involved.'"
As background for analyzing the difficulties faced by multinational
issuers, this paper will discuss briefly the security distribution methods
of the United Kingdom and the United States. The scope of this discus-
sion is limited to these two countries because the SEC release restricted
participation in any experimental program to the United States, the
United Kingdom and Canada. Canada's distribution system is not ex-
amined because of its similarity to that of the United States'."'
A. Security Distribution Method in the United Kingdom
The British use a "queue" system to distribute stocks. Under the
queue system, the issuer applies in advance for a date on which it may
offer its stock for sale.' 2 The application is made to the Government
Broker (a department of the Bank of England), who sets the day the
securities can be sold, the "impact day.' 4 The rationale for the queue
method is that the government will be better able to avoid unantici-
pated demands on British capital." Thus, under the British system, the
37. In June 1977, British Petroleum (BP) offered over one billion dollars of its
stock in the United Kingdom, North America, and elsewhere. The offering price,
world-wide, ranged from $14.53 to $16.12. Since 1977, BP has held other offerings (in
1979 and 1983). Letter from British Petroleum Company, PLC to John Wheeler, Sec-
retary of the SEC, at 1 (July 25, 1985). For a description of the offering, see Appendix
to Letter from the American Bar Association: Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 1-3 (July 15, .1985) [hereinaf-
ter ABA Appendix].
38. In early June 1984, Reuters Holdings held a 1.7 billion dollar offering. For a
description of the offering, see ABA Appendix, supra note 37, at 4-14.
39. For an analysis of this offering, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Alcan Aluminum, 1983; Bell Canada Enterprises, 1983; Echo Bay
Mines, Ltd., 1984 and 1985; Essette Business Systems, Inc., 1984; Louis Vuitton, S.A.,
1984; and Ranger Oil, Ltd., 1979-83.
41. The Release, supra note 1, at 915, col. 3; see also 10A H. BLOOMENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 4-3 (1986). In Can-
ada, securities regulation is conducted at the province level, not the national level.
However, there is generally uniformity among the securities laws of the provinces. See
id. at Ch. 4 for a discussion of Canadian securities law in general and how unanimity is
achieved in that country's securities law.
42. Letter from the American Bar Association: Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 12-13 (July 15, 1985)
[hereinafter ABA Letter].
43. Id.
44. Letter from the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges to John Wheeler, Secre-
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issuer knows well in advance when it will go to market. This is the
inverse image of the United States' system, where the "impact day" is
undetermined until the last minute because of the uncertain time of
completion of SEC review and blue-sky clearance and because of
changing market conditions.
Once the position in the queue is established, the securities are
distributed in one of two ways: offer by subscription or offer by tender.
In offer by subscription "the offering price is set and solicitations from
the public are sought on the day the offering is publicly announced [the
impact day] . . . .,,i The prospectus establishing the offering price
and providing disclosure is reprinted in national newspapers, along with
subscription forms. Investors then have a short period in which to sub-
scribe to the offering. 46 After all of the subscriptions are in, there is an
"allotment day" on which announcements are made as to which bro-
kers' and investors' subscriptions will be honored. Often the offerings
are oversubscribed, which makes the allotment day extremely impor-
tant to investors.
Offer by tender is slightly different. The issuer uses a "subscrip-
tion" period, but the price is not inflexible, as in offer by subscription.
Here, the underwriters establish a minimum tender price, below which
no shares will be sold.47 Investors then subscribe, paying a price that
they determine. After the application period is over, the underwriters
determine a "striking price" based on the tenders received. Applica-
tions that are below the striking price are returned with their pay-
ments. Applications above the striking price are accepted, and the ex-
cess of tender offers above the striking price is remitted.48
Regardless of the method used, a definitive prospectus establishing
either the minimum tender price or the fixed price must be filed. 49 Al-
though this is the first formal filing by the issuer, the London Stock
Exchange conducts a review in advance of this filing. 50 Once a defini-
tary of the SEC, at 8 (July 12, 1985) [hereinafter Weil Letter].
45. The Release, supra note I, at 915, col. 3.
46. The length of time allowed for solicitations is typically three to fourteen days.
Id. at 915 n.20.
47. Issuers use an offer for sale by tender when they anticipate a strong demand
for their security. They are better able to price the stock for what it is worth. ABA
Appendix, supra note 37, at 6 n.11.
48. Id.
49. If the issuer is listed on the London Stock Exchange, or is going to list, it must
file the definitive prospectus with the Exchange. 10A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41,
at 6-27.
50. Id. at 6-29 n.9; see also ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 13.
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tive prospectus is filed, it cannot thereafter be amended. 1
Typically, the definitive prospectus is filed fourteen days before the
impact day. 2 This has caused coordination and timing problems for
issuers. As one issuer has noted, "there was considerable concern both
among the underwriting group, and within BCE [Bell Canada Enter-
prises], that the international underwriters not benefit from a head
start in the marketing of the issue . . ... " Generally, therefore, the
U.S. offering would not commence until a prospectus is filed in the
United Kingdom, which leaves little time for a U.S. underwriting syn-
dicate to obtain SEC clearance."
Recently, however, the United Kingdom, with its adoption of the
European Economic Community's Sixth Directive, has permitted the
use of "pathfinder" prospectuses. These prospectuses are very similar to
a U.S. preliminary prospectus. 5 They give the issuer the flexibility to
amend the prospectus to accommodate to changing market conditions.
They also give the issuer more time to obtain SEC clearance. As noted
earlier, the issuer does not normally commence its U.S. offering until
the U.K. definitive prospectus is filed. Now, with the use of a "path-
finder" prospectus, U.S. underwriters will be able to commence their
offerings earlier, thus minimizing the risk that SEC and blue-sky clear-
ances will not be completed before impact day."
B. Security Distribution Method in the United States
The time constraints for distributing securities in the United
States are considerably less rigid than in the United Kingdom. There is
no queue; once the SEC finds that there has been full and fair disclo-
sure by the issuer, the offering is ready to go immediately. Therefore,
in the United States, as opposed to the United Kingdom, it is the issuer
and not the regulatory body that determines when the offering will
occur.
5 7
51. ABA Appendix, supra note 37, at 11.
52. 10A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41, at 6-29.
53. Letter from Bell Canada Enterprises to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC,
at 1 (July 4, 1985).
54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
55. ABA Appendix, supra note 37, at 18.
56. The British Telecommunications Offering, discussed infra at text accompany-
ing note 78, illustrates how the pathfinder prospectus was used to ease time constraints.
57. Section 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") states that the offer-
ing will become effective twenty days after the registration statement is filed; however,
section 8(b) gives the SEC the authority to suspend the running of the twenty days
until it determines that the issuer has made adequate disclosure. While it is the SEC
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The Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") governs offerings of new
securities in the United States."8 Absent an exemption, all issuers of
new securities must file a registration statement pursuant to section 6.89
Sections 6 through 12 of the 1933 Act govern the processing of the
registration statement until it becomes effective. Once the SEC's Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance determines that adequate disclosure has
been made, the registration statement becomes effective and the offer-
ing can commence. Typically, the offering price is not determined until
the last minute when an amendment to the registration statement is
filed. According to section 8(a) the offering becomes effective no later
than twenty days after the amendment, but the SEC staff will often
accelerate this date.60
The whole registration process is divided into three parts by sec-
tion 5 of the 1933 Act. Section 5(c) establishes the "pre-filing" period.
This section makes it unlawful to buy or sell securities before a regis-
tration statement is filed. 6' The rationale for this prohibition is that
investors' decisions should not be determined by potentially misleading
information not found in registration statements. Section 5(b) creates
the "waiting" period, the time between the initial filing of the registra-
tion statement and its date of effectiveness. In the waiting period, oral
offers are permitted and written offers are allowed if certain disclosure
standards are satisfied. A written offer can be made if it is accompa-
nied with either a "tombstone ad," a preliminary prospectus or a sum-
mary prospectus.6" Finally, section 5(a) creates the "post-effective" pe-
that gives clearance, it is ultimately the issuer that determines when full disclosure is
made, and thus when the offering will occur. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 8(a)-(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77h(a)-(b) (1982).
58. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
59. Section 3 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982), exempts certain classes of
securities from registration requirements, and section 4 exempts certain transactions.
For a complete analysis of the exemptions pursuant to these sections, see generally T.
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 85-160 (1985).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.461(b) (1986) sets forth the SEC's policy: "[lIt is the gen-
eral policy of the Commission, upon request . . . to permit acceleration of the effective
date of the registration statement as soon as possible after the filing of appropriate
amendments, if any."
61. Preliminary negotiations between issuers and underwriters, however, are al-
lowed at this stage. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982). This
allows the issuer to obtain a firm commitment from an underwriter before it spends a
lot of money preparing the registration statement.
62. 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1986) lists twelve categories of information that can be
included in an identifying statement, or tombstone ad, and not constitute an offer for
sale in violation of section 5(b). 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.430-31 (1986) describe the content
requirements for the preliminary and summary prospectuses.
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riod. In this period the actual sales can be consummated.
The 1933 Act also contains several express liability provisions.63
Section 11 imposes liability on certain designated categories of persons
for material misstatements in a registration statement or for an omis-
sion of a required fact.64 Section 12(1) establishes absolute liability for
offering or selling a security in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act.65
Finally, section 12(2) prohibits fraud in connection with the offer or
sale of securities. 6 Liability under this section is imposed if one makes
an untrue statement of a material fact, or omits one, during the offer or
sale of a security when such offer or sale is achieved through the use of
interstate commerce. Section 12(2) is applicable whether or not the se-
curity is sold pursuant to section 5.
British securities law also contains various express liability provi-
sions, including several that are similar to sections 11 and 12(2) of the
1933 Act and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.67 However, there are some notable differences. In the United
63. Liability has also been implied under other statutes; for example, section 10,
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986), of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. The circuits are not uniform in their application of these strictures. A
discussion of the breadth of implied remedies is beyond the scope of this paper, but for
a more complete analysis of the subject, see Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of
Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA.
L. REV. 641 (1978); Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980); and Stein-
berg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33
(1979).
64. These categories are: the registrant, all directors of the issuer, all other per-
sons who sign the registration statement, all underwriters, and any expert who certified
a part of the registration statement. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1982).
65. For an analysis of section 12(l), see T. HAZEN, supra note 59, at 182-85.
66. Section 12(2) and section I may appear to be similar and their applications
often overlap. However, there are some important differences between them. Section
11, unlike section 12(2), is not applicable to oral misstatements. Privity is required for
an action under 12(2), but not under section 11. And, the burden of proof that the
plaintiff (purchaser) had no knowledge of the misstatement is placed on the plaintiff
under section 12(2), whereas under section 11 it falls on the defendant. See R. JEN-
NINGS AND H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 777 (5th ed.
1982).
67. In the United Kingdom, there are express remedies under the common law
and the Companies Act of 1948. An action may be brought against the issuer or those
persons responsible for any misstatement. First, under the common law, the investor
can bring an action to rescind the contract (the solicitation application) or sue for
damages under a theory of fraud or negligent misstatement. Under the Companies Act
of 1948, there are two liability provisions. Section 43 holds one liable for compensation
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States, anyone liable under section 11, other than the issuer, can raise a
due diligence defense if a reasonable investigation has been made. In
England, however, a defense can be established merely upon presenting
a reasonable belief in the veracity and accuracy of the information.
That belief need not be based on a reasonable investigation, per se.68
C. Problems in Coordinating a Multinational Offering
As mentioned earlier, the various underwriting syndicates involved
in a simultaneous multinational offering desire that all underwriters be
placed on equal footing, i.e., exposed to the same risks.69 This means
that information about the offering should be disclosed simultaneously
and that the ultimate ready-for-market date is the same for all partici-
pating countries. However, the dissimilarities in the U.S. and British
regulatory systems noted above have, in the past, made it difficult to
achieve the desired simultaneity of offering activity.
One of the major problems faced by multinational issuers is the
risk that the U.S. offering will not be cleared before the British impact
day. This problem stems from the lack of simultaneity in the establish-
ment of U.S. and U.K. underwriters' risks. In Britain, the underwriters'
risk begins upon the filing of the definitive prospectus. In the United
States, the risk arises when the registration statement is declared effec-
tive. British underwriters, in order to minimize their risks, have a
vested interest in filing the definitive prospectus as close to impact day
as possible. The longer the British underwriters wait to file their pro-
spectuses, the less time the U.S. underwriters have to obtain SEC
clearance. °
Substantial efforts to alleviate these problems have been made by
the regulatory bodies in the United States and the United Kingdom. In
the United States, the SEC has been willing to hold pre-filing confer-
ences to iron out complex disclosure issues.7 Some commentators have
suggested that the SEC be even more accommodating. The Securities
Industry Association has "urge[d] the Commission to adopt 'pre-clear-
ance' procedures and a willingness to agree on a timetable for effective-
to subscribers if a misrepresentation is made in a prospectus. The potential defendants
are very similar to those liable under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Section
38(4) establishes similar liability for an omission from a British prospectus. See gener-
ally 10A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41, at 6-40 - 6-44.
68. The Release, supra note 1, at 916, col. 2.
69. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
70. As discussed supra at text accompanying notes 52-54.
71. ABA Appendix, supra note 37, at 12. See also Davis Letter, supra note 11,
at 3.
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ness of the registration statement. 7 2 The law firm of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, the firm which handled the Reuters offering, has even recom-
mended that "consideration should be given to elimination of Commis-
sion staff review."7 8 In the United Kingdom, the emergence of "path-
finder" prospectuses has lengthened the gap between the filing of a
U.K. registration statement and the impact day without exposing U.K.
underwriters to more risk.
Another source of concern for multinational issuers is the diver-
gence in permissible marketing activities between the two countries. In
the United Kingdom, marketing efforts typically begin well before pro-
spectuses are disseminated to the investing public. In the United States
the opposite is true, since marketing activity cannot commence until
the registration statement has been filed. This has been a great source
of irritation to U.S. underwriters for two reasons: (1) U.S. underwriters
think they are at a competitive disadvantage in marketing their part of
the offering;76 and (2) U.S. underwriters fear that the pre-marketing
activities of foreign underwriters may result in allegations that they
were pre-conditioning the market in violation of section 12(1) of the
1933 Act.7 ' The use of "pathfinder" prospectuses and pre-filing confer-
ences may help to lessen tensions between underwriting syndicates in
regard to U.S. underwriters being left at the starting gate, but they will
not decrease the potential liability of U.S. underwriters because of for-
eign marketing activity.
A final major problem faced by multinational issuers is the differ-
ence in the disclosure requirements and accounting standards among
countries.77
72. Letter from the Securities Industry Association to John Wheeler, Secretary of
the SEC, at 8 (Sept. 3, 1985). See also Davis Letter, supra note 11, at 3.
73. Weil Letter, supra note 44, at 9.
74. For a discussion of a "pathfinder" prospectus, see supra notes 55-56 and ac-
companying text.
75. The ABA noted that in "virtually all U.S.-U.K. dual offerings to date, the
number of shares finally allocated to the U.S. has been less than that initially allocated
at the commencement of the offering." ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 14.
76. Weil Letter, supra note 44, at 9. For a "real-life" example of the tensions
between U.S. and U.K. underwriters, see The Perils of Multimarket Offerings, supra
note 22, at 71.
77. For a complete description of the differences in the disclosure requirements,
financial statement requirements and non-financial statement disclosure requirements
among the United States, the United Kingdom and selected Canadian provinces, see
the SEC Staff Survey Report found in file S7-9-85 in the SEC's Public Reference
Room.
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D. British Telecommunications, PLC: An Example of a Recent
Multinational Offering
On December 3, 1984, British Telecommunications completed a
simultaneous transnational offering totaling $4.5 billion, the largest eq-
uity offering in the world to date. The offering is unique because for
the first time a British pathfinder prospectus was used in a multina-
tional offering. On October 26, 1984, a U.S. registration statement was
filed contemporaneously with a British pathfinder. The definitive pro-
spectus was filed on November 16, the impact day. This illustrates how
the pathfinder prospectus may serve to limit the British underwriters'
risk, while at the same time U.S. underwriters are given more time to
obtain SEC clearance. The pathfinder also allowed for the incorpora-
tion in the U.K. definitive prospectus of amendments that had to be
made in the U.S. registration statement. Applications to purchase
shares in the United Kingdom were accepted until November 24. On
December 3 a final pricing amendment was made to the U.S. registra-
tion statement. Trading in the stock began on December 3 at 10:00
a.m. EST on the New York, London, and Toronto Stock Exchanges. 78
It seems likely that the structure of future multinational offerings will
be modeled after the British Telecommunication's offering unless coor-
dinated regulatory steps are taken by countries to facilitate such
offerings.
IV. THE SEC RELEASE
In response to the increasing globalization of the world's capital
markets and the difficulties confronted by recent transnational issuers,
the SEC in February 1985 solicited comments on the facilitation of
multinational offerings. 79 Comments were to be restricted to a facilita-
tion program limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Canada. The rationale was that "issuers from these countries use the
United States' capital markets frequently and their disclosure require-
ments are ... similar to the United States' . . 8 After providing a
general factual background on growing internationalization,81 the re-
78. ABA Appendix, supra note 37, at 14-19.
79. The Release, supra note 1, at 914, col. 1.
80. Id. at 914, col. 2.
81. The Release points out that "underwritten foreign debt and equity offerings in
the United States have averaged over $5 billion per year since 1975." It also notes that
secondary market trading in U.S. stocks by foreign investors has increased from 17.2
billion dollars in 1970 to 134 billion dollars in 1983. Id. at 915, col. 1. See also supra
notes 1-4 and accompanying text for a discussion of some recent examples of the inter-
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lease went on to compare the regulatory differences among the three
countries.82 Two approaches designed to facilitate more offerings were
introduced: the reciprocal approach and the common prospectus ap-
proach. The following is an analysis of these approaches.
A. The Reciprocal Approach
This approach envisions an agreement "by each of the three coun-
tries to adopt a reciprocal system providing that an offering document
used by the issuer in its own country would be accepted for offerings in
each of the other countries .... " The foreign issuers, however, would
still be subject to the liability provisions of U.S. securities laws.84
B. The Common Prospectus Approach
The common prospectus approach calls for the countries "to agree
on disclosure standards for an offering document that could be used in
two or more of the three countries. 85 As with the reciprocal approach,
the SEC would still require that U.S. liability provisions be applicable.
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Approach
The drawbacks and attributes of the two approaches can best be
examined by evaluating them in terms of the following three criteria:
ease of implementation, cost to the issuer and information provided to
investors.
1. Ease of Implementation
The reciprocal approach would be much easier and simpler to im-
plement. If the common prospectus approach is pursued, it is likely to
take many years for the countries to reach an agreement on what con-
stitutes "standard disclosure." For example, it took the European Eco-
nomic Community eight years to formulate a rule governing prospec-
tuses filed within the Community.8" The length of time needed to reach
agreement on a common prospectus has led many commentators to
nationalization of capital markets.
82. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the
differences in distribution methods. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the differences in liability provisions.
83. The Release, supra note 1, at 916, col. 3.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 3.
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conclude that the reciprocal approach should be pursued instead.8"
2. Cost to the Issuer
Under the reciprocal approach the offering would be reviewed only
in the issuer's home country. This approach, presumably, would be less
costly to issuers because they need to go through the review process
only once. Also, issuers would be familiar with the laws with which
they have to comply. The common prospectus approach, by contrast,
would be more costly to issuers because of the multiplicity of review
levels involved.88
3. Information Provided to Investors
A significant drawback to the reciprocal approach is that U.S. in-
vestors would not receive enough information about multinational issu-
ers if the disclosure standards of a foreign country were less rigorous
than those in the United States. For instance, a Canadian issuer would
be able to satisfy SEC disclosure requirements if it were "cleared" in
Canada, but it would provide less information to U.S. investors relative
to the disclosures made by a U.S. firm. This disadvantage of the recip-
rocal approach exists only if U.S. securities laws require more rigorous
disclosure.89
While the common prospectus approach could result in more infor-
mation being supplied to U.S. investors about foreign multinational is-
suers, it is conceivable that U.S. investors would not receive the invest-
ment information they have grown accustomed to receiving. This
situation would develop if the agreed upon "common standards" for
disclosure were lower than the present U.S. standards. U.S. investors
would have less information about a foreign multinational issuer than
they would have about a U.S. domestic issuer.
This problem of varying degrees of disclosure to investors may not
materialize under the common prospectus approach, however, for two
reasons. First, U.S. liability provisions may coerce underwriters into
providing as much disclosure as a domestic U.S. issuer. This coercive
pressure would also cause more disclosure to be made by a foreign is-
suer under the reciprocal approach. Second, there is a feeling among
87. See e.g., Letter from Seidman & Seidman to John Wheeler, Secretary of the
SEC, at 2 (July 2, 1985) [hereinafter Seidman Letter]; ABA Letter, supra note 42, at
4; Merrill Lynch Letter, supra note 28, at 3; Weil Letter, supra note 44, at 3-4.
88. The Release, supra note 1, at 917, col. 1.
89. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for support that U.S. securities laws
require more rigorous disclosure.
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several commentators that, if countries attempted to develop a common
prospectus, the disclosure standards agreed to would be very similar to
U.S. standards.90
Another group affected by varying degrees of disclosure is domes-
tic U.S. issuers. If a reciprocal approach were adopted, U.S. domestic
and multinational issuers would be on equal footing in terms of disclo-
sure; however, a foreign corporation would have access to U.S. inves-
tors without making the same costly disclosures. This would place do-
mestic U.S. issuers at a competitive disadvantage to foreign issuers. If
a common prospectus approach (with disclosure standards lower than
in the United States) were adopted, domestic U.S. issuers would also
be at a disadvantage relative to other U.S. multinational firms. As
noted earlier, however, any harm to domestic U.S. issuers in the form
of displaced capital-raising opportunities is likely to be negligible.91
In sum, if the common prospectus approach were adopted, there
would be uniform disclosure by multinational issuers, and presumably
more disclosure than with the reciprocal approach. However, it is con-
ceivable that U.S. investors, under either approach, would not receive
the disclosure they are accustomed to receiving.
V. RESPONSES To THE RELEASE
The Release elicited comments from a wide variety of players in
the field of international finance. In total, there were sixty responses
from U.S., U.K. and Canadian corporations, law firms, and other inter-
ested organizations. The vast majority of these responses favored the
reciprocal approach over the common prospectus approach. However,
this preference for most commentators was not because of the over-
whelming superiority of the reciprocal approach, but rather because the
common prospectus approach would be too cumbersome to bring about.
As one commentator stated, "[Wihile the common prospectus ap-
proach does represent an ideal goal and, in that sense, is preferable to
the reciprocal approach, we believe attainment of that goal to be un-
realistic or at least subject to such delays as to negate the benefits
sought." 9 Although the majority of responses were very similar in their
90. See Letter from the Ontario Securities Commission to John Wheeler, Secre-
tary of the SEC, at 1 (June 6, 1985) [hereinafter Ontario Letter]; Letter from the law
firm of McCarthy & McCarthy to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 1-2 (July
18, 1985) [hereinafter McCarthy Letter]; Letter from B.A.T. Industries to John
Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 2 (July 2, 1985); and Davis Letter, supra note 11,
at 3.
91. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
92. Weil Letter, supra note 44, at 3-4.
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support for the reciprocal approach, a few less common responses are
worth noting.
Several commentators, while supporting the reciprocal approach,
believed that the scope of the program should not be limited to the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Nikko Securities
Company stated that "no matter which method is chosen, Japan should
definitely participate .... ,,o The company noted that, aside from the
United States, Japan has the largest capital market in the world. There
were also responses from several Dutch issuers and the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange suggesting that the SEC broaden its scope.94 Other
commentators, including the New York Stock Exchange, supported the
idea as well.98
Two groups, the Issuing Houses Association and the Ontario Se-
curities Commission, did not think the facilitation of multinational of-
ferings should be pursued at all. The Issuing Houses Association, the
representative for several principal merchant banks in London and
other issuing houses in Britain, believes that the disadvantages from
harmonization outweigh the benefits. The Association listed the follow-
ing four disadvantages: (1) the application of U.S. liability provisions
to British companies; (2) the increased costs; (3) the imposition of for-
eign marketing procedures on Britain's domestic system; and (4) the
imposition of disclosure standards higher than those prevailing in Brit-
ain.96 The Ontario Securities Commission believes that neither ap-
proach should be pursued now because of the paucity of multinational
offerings to date. The Commission states that issuers target specific of-
ferings for specific markets, and thus if an issuer wants to proceed with
a simultaneous offering it will. The differing requirements among the
participating countries, according to the Commission, would not deter
93. Letter from the Nikko Securities Company to John Wheeler, Secretary of the
SEC, at 2 (July 15, 1985).
94. Letter from Unilever, PLC to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 1 (July
12, 1985); Letter from N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij to
John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 1 (July 11, 1985); Letter from the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 1 (Sept. 26, 1985).
95. Letter from the New York Stock Exchange to John Wheeler. Secretary of the
SEC, at I (Aug. 26, 1985); Letter from the law firm of Whitman & Ransom to John
Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 6-7 (July 12, 1985) [hereinafter Whitman & Ran-
som Letter]; Letter from G.B. Hackert, Cox & Co., Ltd. to John Wheeler, Secretary of
the SEC, at 2 (May 13, 1985); Letter from the accounting firm of Clarkson Gordon to
John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 3 (July 10, 1985).
96. Letter from the Issuing Houses Association to John Wheeler, Secretary of the
SEC, at 1-2 (June 12, 1985).
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such offerings.97
Only one group, the Bar Association of New York, favored the
common prospectus approach over the reciprocal approach. The Bar
Association supported the common prospectus approach because of
four factors. One, the approach provides for uniform disclosure. Two,
the approach is more capable of leading to harmonization of periodic
reporting requirements. Three, the imposition of liability provisions on
uniform disclosure is fairer and has less of a deterrent effect on mul-
tinational offerings than if the disclosure standards are varied. Four,
the adoption of the reciprocal approach would eliminate incentives to
harmonize disclosure standards."' The Bar Association recognized that
the common prospectus approach would be difficult to implement; how-
ever, it raised the valid point that U.S. issuers have been juggling state
Blue-Sky administrators for years.99
Two commentators, the Ontario Securities Commission and the
Canadian law firm of McCarthy & McCarthy, were opposed to the two
proposals because they viewed them as attempts by the SEC to expand
the application of U.S. securities laws to other countries.'00 "Put
bluntly, we are concerned that a multinational securities offering policy
may be a back door way of imposing, over time, SEC style regulations
to other countries' capital markets."''
Finally, several commentators suggested a modified approach. 02
The approaches typically call for standards that an issuer would have
to meet in order to take advantage of a facilitation program. In addi-
tion, the proposals call for a supplement to foreign issuers' offering
statements. This supplement would generally disclose the differences
among the countries' regulatory systems and the risks involved in
purchasing foreign securities. The next part of the paper, suggesting a
modified approach, incorporates many of the suggestions made by these
commentators.
97. See generally Ontario Letter, supra note 90.
98. Letter from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Committee
on Securities Regulation to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 1-3 (May 21,
1985).
99. Id. at 3.
100. Ontario Letter, supra note 90, at I and McCarthy Letter, supra note 90,
at 1.
101. Ontario Letter, supra note 90, at 1.
102. Whitman & Ransom Letter, supra note 95, at 4-8; Weil Letter, supra note
44, at 4; ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 6-10; McCarthy Letter, supra note 90, at 2-3.
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VI. A Two-TIERED RECIPROCAL APPROACH
Under a two-tiered reciprocal approach, foreign issuers would ei-
ther qualify for complete reciprocity, the first tier, or they would be
required to file a supplement with the offering documents cleared in
their home country, the second tier. In the first tier the issuers would
not be required to file any supplemental information. To qualify for
first-tier treatment, the issuer would have to be of "world-class"
calibre.'03
A facilitation policy involving reciprocity is realistically the only
viable alternative. As noted earlier, it took the European Economic
Community eight years to arrive at an agreement on their Sixth Direc-
tive.""4 The overwhelming response from commentators that it would be
difficult to arrive at common prospectus standards is further evidence
that reciprocity is the best route to creating a global capital market. In
sum, the time, expense and negotiations involved in developing a com-
mon prospectus, coupled with the possibility that an agreement might
never be reached, argue strongly against pursuing the common prospec-
tus approach.
However, an unrestricted policy of reciprocity could be harmful to
investors if they were not fully informed of the risks involved in
purchasing foreign securities. The two-tiered approach attempts to
minimize the risk of uninformed investors by limiting participation in
the program to qualified issuers. The following is a description of the
suggested standards for each tier and the mechanics of an offering
under each tier.105
A. The First Tier
1. Standards
The first tier would be limited to true world-class issuers. The
SEC's treatment of domestic and foreign issuers is of some guidance as
to how to define a world-class issuer. The Commission has developed an
integrated disclosure system for domestic and foreign issuers whereby
the amount of disclosure required in an offering statement is inversely
related to the size of the issuer and/or the issuer's history of periodic
reporting under the 1934 Act. 106 The rationale for this disclosure policy
103. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105. This proposal is not attempting to establish particular standards for each tier,
only general guidelines.
106. For domestic issuers this is accomplished through Forms S-I, S-2 and S-3,
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is that presumably there is already considerable information dissemi-
nated throughout the investing community about the issuer due to its
size and public presence and reporting history. The two-tiered ap-
proach, while adopting the SEC's general concept of varying disclosure
according to the issuer's size and periodic reporting history, would not
fully adopt the SEC standards. The concept of reciprocity would be
defeated if issuers had to satisfy SEC standards first. Therefore, when
reference is made to reporting requirements as a prerequisite for a par-
ticular tier, the reporting need only be pursuant to requirements similar
to the SEC's, not to the SEC's per se. 107
An issuer could qualify for first tier treatment in one of two ways.
First, if it is of appropriate magnitude in terms of total assets, revenue
and net income, it would qualify. One commentator has suggested the
following requirements for equity offerings: total assets of
$200,000,000; total revenues of $250,000,000 during each of the last
three years; net income of not less than $40,000,000 over each of the
past three years; and no history of default or lack of payment to share-
holders within the past year.108 The rationale for allowing an issuer to
have full reciprocity based solely on its size is that the first tier should
be available for initial public offerings. W ithout such a provision, issu-
ers like British Telecommunications and Reuters would not have been
17 C.F.R. §§ 239.11-239.13 (1986). Form S-1 is for issuers who do not qualify for
other expedited treatment. It is used primarily by first-time issuers or small public
companies. Form S-2 can be used by issuers if they have been subject to the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act for at least three years. Form S-3 is available to issuers
who have reported for three years and who have satisfied one of the following size
requirements: 150 million dollars of voting stock held by nonaffiliates or 100 million
dollars of voting stock held by nonaffiliates and a trading volume of at least 300 million
shares in each of the past three years.
17 C.F.R. §§ 239.31-239.33 subjects foreign issuers to similar treatment. Form F-
3 is available to world-class issuers who have reported pursuant to the 1934 Act for at
least three years. The SEC's definition of a "world-class" issuer is found at 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.33(a)(4): when the "aggregate market value worldwide of the voting stock held
by nonaffiliates of the registrant is equivalent to $300 million or more. ... An issuer
can qualify to use Form F-2 several ways: (I) if the offering is made only to existing
shareholders and the issuer has filed one prior annual disclosure statement; (2) if the
issuer has reported for three years; or (3) if the issuer is world class under F-3 but has
only filed one annual disclosure statement. Form F-I is required for all issuers who do
not qualify for Form F-2 or F-3. See Note, Foreign Securities: Integration and Disclo-
sure Under the Securities and Exchange Acts 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911, 921-25
(1983).
107. Thus, if the countries agree, an issuer would qualify for the program if it has
regularly filed periodic reports with Canadian provinces or the London Stock
Exchange.
108. ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 8.
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able to qualify because they had no history of periodic reporting or
trading.10 9
Second, an issuer could qualify for the first tier if it satisfied estab-
lished size requirements and had been subject to periodic reporting. re-
quirements for three years. 1
2. Mechanics of an Offering Under the First Tier
If an issuer were in this tier, it would have to supply only the offer-
ing statement approved by its home country. This would satisfy all of
the issuer's disclosure requirements for foreign countries. The issuer
could supply additional information to a foreign jurisdiction if it were
concerned about the liability provisions of a foreign country, but this
would not be required.'
B. The Second Tier
1. Standards
To qualify for second tier treatment, the issuer would have to have
a reporting history of at least two years and be of a specified size. Un-
like the first tier, however, a second tier issuer would not be able to
qualify solely because of size. The rationale for this is that, unless the
issuer is gigantic, it is harmful to investors to invest in a foreign corpo-
ration with no history of disclosure or trading.
2. Mechanics of an Offering Under the Second Tier
If an issuer were under the second tier, its home country's offering
statement could satisfy a foreign country's disclosure requirements if a
satisfactory supplement were attached to it. The foreign country would
have control over what is required in the supplement. Although this
control by foreign countries may seem contrary to a reciprocity policy,
it is appropriate, given the risks involved in purchasing foreign securi-
ties. Moreover, if the countries participating in the facilitation program
tried to agree on a common supplement for all countries, the same po-
litical and time concerns that plague the common prospectus approach
would be present.
109. Id. at 9.
110. The requirement of three years is suggested because of SEC statutes de-
scribed supra note 106.
111. It is conceivable that U.S. underwriters may request that a foreign issuer
provide disclosure equivalent to that made by a U.S. domestic issuer in order to avoid
any possible section 11 liability.
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The responses to the Release provide several suggestions as to
what the SEC should require in a foreign issuer's supplement. The
ABA's response made the following suggestions for the contents of a
supplement:... (1) a description of the methodology of distribution of
securities in the issuer's home country; (2) a reconciliation of the is-
suer's financial statements with the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) of the United States; "' (3) a segment entitled
"Management's Discussion and Results of Operations";"' and (4) any-
thing else that is found to be of fundamental importance by the
regulators.
The North American Securities Administrators Association pro-
posed that the securities laws of the issuer's home country be disclosed.
In particular, they proposed a discussion of the laws in the area of di-
rectors' liability, shareholders' democracy, reorganization procedures,
bankruptcy, tax, and common law matters such as the business judg-
ment rule or piercing the corporate veil."" The Association also saw
the need to reconcile the GAAPs between the issuer's home country
and a foreign jurisdiction. Other commentators made similar sugges-
tions as to the contents of the supplement." 6
In sum, the two-tiered approach creates a sliding scale of reciproc-
ity based on the issuer's size and trading history. The requirement of a
supplement for second tier issuers ensures that investors will be making
reasoned economic decisions. Also, the two-tiered approach, as with
any reciprocal approach, can be expanded to accommodate new coun-
tries more easily than a common prospectus system.
112. ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 7.
113. The ABA suggests that this be done in accordance with Form 20-F, a disclo-
sure form for foreign issuers. The accounting firm of Seidman & Seidman, however,
dealt more specifically with this issue in their response. They suggested that issuers
should comply with Item 17 of Form 20-F, rather than Item 18. Item 17, like Item 18,
calls for a reconciliation of the GAAPs, however, not as extensively. Seidman Letter,
supra note 87, at 5.
114. This section is not included in U.K. prospectuses. Letter from the North
American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. to John Wheeler, Secretary of
the SEC, at 2 (Aug. 16, 1985).
115. Id. at 4. The letter also contains excerpts from the Reuters' prospectus dis-
cussing U.K. securities laws.
116. Whitman & Ransom Letter, supra note 95, at 5; Securities Industry Associ-
ation Letter, supra note 72, at 7.
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VII. TROUBLE SPOTS FOR ANY PROGRAM DESIGNED To
FACILITATE MULTINATIONAL OFFERINGS
A. Liability Provisions
It is possible that sections 11 and 12(1) of the 1933 Act could be
violated by foreign issuers or U.S. underwriters under either the recip-
rocal approach or the common prospectus approach, unless action is
taken by the SEC. n1 These liability provisions could harm a facilita-
tion program because of their deterrent effect.
If a facilitation program calls for less disclosure than is required of
a domestic U.S. firm, for example, there is the possibility that section
11 liability may be triggered due to the omission of a material fact." 8
Section 11 also exposes foreign issuers to more liability than they are
accustomed to in their home countries.119 In other countries an issuer
can raise a due diligence defense against allegations that it made mate-
rial misstatements; however, this is not the case under section 11,
which imposes absolute liability on issuers for any violations of the sec-
tion. It is also conceivable that the issuer or its U.S. underwriter could
be subject to liability under section 12(1) of the 1933 Act because of
the issuer's marketing activities abroad. As noted earlier, more exten-
sive marketing efforts are permitted in other countries than in the
United States. It could be alleged that these activities amount to pre-
conditioning the market.
The possibility of the imposition of liability by U.S. courts on for-
eign participants in a facilitation program would deter participation in
the program and severely limit any gains to be recognized by the pro-
gram. Therefore, if an approach is enacted, the SEC should promul-
gate clear, unambiguous "safe harbors" to guide the activities of for-
eign issuers and their underwriters.
B. Periodic Reporting
If a foreign corporation issues stock in the United States it be-
comes subject to the SEC's periodic reporting requirements under sec-
tions 12(g) or 15(d) of the 1934 Act.12 As one commentator has noted,
117. ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 10-11; Weil Letter, supra note 44, at 5-6.
118. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g) and 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(1)
and 78o(d) (1982). For discussion purposes it is assumed that the foreign issuer is not
exempt from periodic reporting pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-
2(b) (1987), under the 1934 Act.
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the disclosure required in the report may "substantially exceed . . . the
reporting obligations imposed by the regulatory authorities of their
home countries." ' Thus, while the foreign issuer would not have to
comply with the more rigorous SEC disclosure standards at the offering
stage, it would have to later, through its periodic reporting. These re-
porting requirements would serve as a further deterrent to foreign issu-
ers to participate in any facilitation program. Thus, it would be appro-
priate to provide reciprocity in periodic reporting as well.
C. State Blue-Sky Review
When the 1933 Act was created, it did not preempt the field of
securities regulation. Section 18 of the 1933 Act states that "nothing in
this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission ... of
any state . . . over any security .. 1.2.2"' Thus, an issuer must obtain
clearance from the SEC and the states in which it plans to offer its
securities. Unlike the SEC, however, which requires full and adequate
disclosure, most states also require that the offering be fair, just and
equitable. 8 This type of review by the states is termed "merit review."
There has been a great deal of debate recently on whether or not the
states should be allowed to engage in merit review.1 2" However, the fact
remains that they are still doing so.
Merit review by the states is, obviously, a serious roadblock to any
facilitation program. As one commentator stated, "without statutory
modification . . . the improvements made on the federal level will re-
main constrained at the state level."1 2" One state, Massachusetts, has
already expressed its intent to constrain any multinational offering pro-
gram through its merit review policy. The Securities Division for the
State of Massachusetts noted that it "has significant reservations re-
garding the Commission's proposals for the facilitation of multinational
offerings ." 26
Unless appropriate action is taken at the state level, any program
developed by the SEC and other countries could be rendered meaning-
121. ABA Letter, supra note 42, at 12.
122. Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1982).
123. Note, State Securities Regulations: Merit Review of Foreign Equity Offer-
ings, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 939, 947 (1985). See also id. at 947 n.57 for a list of merit
review states.
124. See id. at 958-64 for an analysis of the arguments on either side.
125. Id. at 965.
126. Letter from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Office of the Secretary of
State, Securities Division to John Wheeler, Secretary of the SEC, at 5-6 (July 18,
1985).
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less if the states insist on merit review.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The SEC's Release is an indication that it is time to address the
globalization of the world's capital markets through the use of more
frequent simultaneous multinational securities offerings. This paper has
analyzed the two approaches suggested by the SEC to facilitate more
multinational offerings and has used this analysis in developing an al-
ternative system, a two-tiered reciprocal approach. It is hoped that this
approach will make some contribution to the debate as to what should
be the optimal approach to internationalizing capital markets. In any
event, it is clear that there are numerous obstacles facing any facilita-
tion program and that these obstacles must be removed before any pro-
gram can be effective.

